

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION


Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01203A000200400021-7

MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 30, 1953

WA  
JG  
76204  
FILE COPY  
IWG/D-33



TO: Chairman IWG

FROM: MSA Member

SUBJECT: Comments on IWG/D-33 (Strategic Importance of Magnetic Recorders)

I have discussed this draft with the MSA representatives on the ERAC and ACEP committees for whose use the paper is primarily intended. Their general comment has been that in its present form the paper would be of only a very limited usefulness to them. They have indicated a desire for much more of the detailed intelligence data on which the conclusions of this report are presumably based. Specifically they have raised the following questions:

- (1) What quantities of recorders of category (A) and (B) are now used in the Bloc?
- (2) Is there any specific evidence that a shortage of specialized recorders is slowing up Soviet weapons research? Is there any evidence of the extent to which specialized recorders are presently used in Soviet weapons research?
- (3) Do specialized recorders embody any technical know-how not available in the Bloc?
- (4) The paper indicates that the Soviet Bloc is in fact presently producing most, if not all, component parts used in modern recorders. In quantitative terms how much of a burden would it be on the Soviet electronics industry to supply the Bloc's annual minimum requirement of recorders?
- (5) Is there positive information available that the Bloc is not producing high speed or specialized recorders, or is the statement based only on a lack of information that they are producing such recorders?
- (6) What specific evidence do we have as to the priority the Soviet Bloc has placed on the procurement of category (A) and (B) type of magnetic recorders from Western sources? Do we have any evidence of any large scale shipments to the Bloc? Have they played a role in trade agreement negotiations?

\*DOC Exempt Letter In EUR File\*

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01203A000200400021-7

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



-2-

Since the U.S. is not now shipping recorders to the Bloc, the determination of the strategic rating of certain types of recorders would seem to be of practical significance primarily in connection with possible proposals for an international rating. Such proposals, particularly when they concern items generally considered as of a civilian nature, need to be back stopped by careful and detailed documentation if we are to have any chance of persuading our allies. I would request therefore that as much of the details requested above as are available to the intelligence agencies be incorporated into the paper. Where full details are not available, I think it would be desirable to explicitly identify the gaps in our information and to clearly indicate the type of data on which our estimates are based. Such a procedure would, I believe, greatly enhance the value of the report. It would also prevent a situation from arising whereby ING members are asked to in fact endorse the conclusions of one member agency and embody them in an ING report without an opportunity of examining the facts from which these conclusions are drawn.

cc: [REDACTED] CIA  
Miss H. Lincoln, State  
Mr. R. Hale, DMS  
Mr. J. Tucker, NSA

25X1A9a

707 31 5 ON 6/4/52

BB-CVC

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION